Tuesday, 12 July 2016

A Week is a Long Time in Politics

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A Week in Politics...
Recent events have been so momentous that I am now moved to put pen to paper, or at any rate finger to keyboard, to unburden myself of my own long-simmering cogitations on the matters in hand.
Harold Wilson once said that “A week is a long time in politics”. The last week or so, as from Thursday, 23rd June, seems to have encompassed about twenty, thirty, forty years worth of events. It is as if the film of politics has suddenly been speeded up. To quote another politician, Lord Halifax, in the immediate aftermath of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of September 1939 that precipitated the Nazi onslaught on Poland and Britain’s consequent declaration of war on Germany, “Every ism is now a wasm.” I have never known a week like it in British politics. British membership of the EU which had seemed to be set in concrete has been dissolved; the EU itself is in crisis as a result; the PM has resigned and precipitated a leadership and, ipso facto, a premiership contest; both major political parties are in a state of turmoil with bitter recrimination and accusations of treachery in one and near civil war in the other; the integrity of the UK itself is again in question with Scotland threatening another independence referendum and the Irish question suddenly re-appearing on the agenda; the markets are going haywire; and the economy is topsy-turvy. Oh yes, and we get the long awaited Chilcot report next week just in case there is a bit of a lull. Phew!
The Referendum
Where to start with all of this? Well, let’s start with the result of the referendum. It was obviously going to be a close run thing but, and I speak as one who voted ‘Leave’ (I may as well declare my bias at the outset), I expected it to be about 52%-48% for ‘Remain’. I was right about the percentages but wrong about the direction. There is usually a swing back to the status quo in the run-up to a vote of any sort – we witnessed it with the Scottish referendum a couple of years ago – and anyway I was always a bit sceptical about the polls which showed Leave ahead at some points. Also, I had a feeling that Remainers were slightly more likely to turn out to vote than Brexiteers across the country. (The pollsters again have not exactly covered themselves with glory.)
But it was evident from the very first couple of results in Newcastle and Sunderland that Brexit could well be heading for a surprise victory, with the former voting for Remain more narrowly than was supposed and the latter voting for Brexit more strongly than was supposed[1]. As I sat glued to the screen from before midnight until six in the morning, frantically switching channels between the BBC, Sky and ITV to gobble up every morsel of information, it was increasingly evident that Brexit was heading for an unlikely victory and that British politics was never going to be the same again. A parade of politicians and pundits were wheeled on and off as the night progressed, many of them almost visibly stunned and trying to explain away what was happening before our eyes.
It was also glaringly evident that there was a very marked disparity between different parts of the country with, as predicted, London, some of the other big cities and Scotland voting strongly for Remain and the rest of the country in between voting strongly Leave. This cut right across traditional Labour/Con or working class/middle class divisions, with old working class redoubts in the north and midlands joining hands with very middle class southern towns and seaside resorts to vote Leave and, seemingly, all classes of people in cosmopolitan London and metropolitan England aligning themselves with Scotland to vote Remain. Truly extraordinary.
If social class, income or party preference ceased to be good predictors of voting intention it seemed that age, generation and level of education were much better indicators, with the young and relatively young being preponderantly Remain and the late middle-aged and elderly preponderantly Leave, and the well-educated preponderantly Remain. This, I think, is unprecedented in that age, per se, scarcely ever has a significant effect on voting intention and views on political questions, even those issues that disproportionately affect the young or the old such as student loans or pensions. I feel that a major reason for this is that the young and early middle-aged cannot remember a time when Britain was not in the EU (or its’ predecessor incarnation as the ‘Common Market’) and view membership of the EU as part of the political furniture; something which is scarcely worthy of mention let alone contention and who are amazed that there are those who should want to leave. The older voter, by contrast, can remember all too well the time when we were not in Europe and may in some cases still yearn for those days. This has led to the rather silly suggestion in some quarters that the young have been betrayed by the old who will not have to live so long with the consequences of the decision, and the utterly daft idea which I have heard mooted even by ordinarily sane and intelligent people (such as a nincompoop on The Moral Maze the other day) that those over a certain age should have been denied the vote or had their vote count for less in some way. It simply begs the question of whether in fact we, as a nation, will be worse off in the long-term. I don’t think so, but time will tell. And anyway the franchise should of course be the same for the referendum as for elections. Why on earth not. We all have to live with the consequences of general elections as well as referenda. Admittedly, elections are more easy to reverse but their effects are still often very long-lasting.
Education, too, is clearly a factor in shaping opinion and there is a very strong bias in favour of the EU within academia, the media, the civil service, the professions and the bien pensant classes generally. This has rather framed the debate with a distinctly elitist feel to some of the arguments put forward on the Remain side, portraying at least some (or even many) Brexiteers as ill-educated, ignorant, geriatric provincials incapable of understanding the benefits of EU membership and the complexities of the argument. In its more virulent form there is a tendency to characterise some in the Brexit camp as reactionary, bigoted, xenophobic and racist. Will Self, for example, has asserted that whilst not all Brexiteers are racist, all racists are Brexiteers (almost certainly not true). Of course there is a great deal of ill-informed and half-baked comment thrown into the mix, on both sides, and doubtless some on the wilder shores of the Brexit campaign deserve some or all of these epithets, but I am far from persuaded that the average Brexiteer is any less astute or erudite than the average Remainer.  

The Campaign
This brings me to the vexed subject of the campaign itself, which I agree was generally conducted on a very low plane, with the great TV debates often descending into shouting matches and scarcely able to get much beyond the direly predictable clichés trotted out with excruciating tedium. I feel the campaign was very inferior to that of the 1975 referendum, though it may be argued that the inferior quality of the debate this time around is due, at least in part, to an inferior quality of politician, right across the spectrum of opinion. I don’t feel that David Cameron, George Osborne, Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, Jeremy Corbyn, Nigel Farage et al, are quite of the same calibre as Harold Wilson, Ted Heath, Roy Jenkins, Margaret Thatcher, Enoch Powell, Michael Foot, Tony Benn etc. from 1975, though maybe I am just an old curmudgeon.
This campaign was marked by a level of crass hyperbole, mendacity and platitudinous thinking surely unrivalled in the annals of British political discourse. It is as if we were debating the structure of the calendar and one side absolutely insisted that the week consisted of eight days to which their opponents would respond that actually it is very definitely and incontrovertibly only six days. The first lot would then say, that, no, they had made a miscalculation and that really is was nine days and the other lot would say, no, they too had been understating their case and that it was emphatically only five days.
To take a few oft-cited examples from both sides the Vote Leave bunch repeatedly asserted that Turkey’s accession to the EU was both certain and imminent when it is surely nothing of the kind (having been on the table in one form or another since 1959). David Cameron responded by saying that Turkey will not be ready for membership until at least the year 3000, despite his having given a speech only six years ago saying he was fully behind speeding up their application. If Cameron told me there were seven days in the week I would check my diary. Then again we have the matter of budgetary contributions and Vote Leave’s mantra, emblazoned on their battle-bus, that our weekly contribution is £350 million, omitting to mention that that is a gross figure and that half comes back in a rebate and much (but not all) of the other half comes back in one form or another as regional aid and such like. The Remain side respond by saying that actually we are probably making a net gain from the EU when we are surely not. The Brexiteers argue a variety of alternatives to EU membership, some saying that we could somehow retain tariff-free access to the single market whilst avoiding the free movement of labour; very obviously an impossibility under EU rules as repeatedly underlined by various EU bigwigs. George Osborne has told us that the average household would be worse-off by £4,500 a year outside the EU; in other words by between a fifth and a sixth. An utterly preposterous suggestion even given a “worst-case scenario”.  I am surprised he didn’t end up by saying that we would all be begging on the streets and foraging in dustbins. And on and on. I am reminded of the celebrated Monty Python sketch where a group of old men talk about how hard their childhoods were, each one trying to outdo the last, until the final speaker announces that, as a lad, he lived in a cardboard box in a swamp, had to work 25 hours a day, eight days a week, had to walk hundreds of miles barefoot across broken glass to get to work where he had to pay his boss rather than the other way around,  and was regularly murdered by his father.
But enough of this tomfoolery. What happens now? I am far from convinced that we actually will ever leave the EU. For a kick-off there are plenty of siren voices among the Remainers who suggest we should have a second referendum of some sort and at some time, perhaps only to decide on what form our departure should take, or maybe even to re-run the whole thing, given that a lot of Brexiteers have apparently repented of their sin in voting to leave or thought that they were really voting on the Eurovision Song Contest. There is a lot of history of countries voting against EU treaties only to be told to do it again and get it right the second time, after a few cosmetic changes to the treaties themselves. Admittedly this is a vote against membership itself not against a treaty, and Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the Commission, and others have been adamant that there can be no back-tracking or a new deal. Moreover the Tory leadership contenders are all saying that the voter’s verdict must be respected etc and ‘Leave must mean Leave’. But none of them seems too keen to actually invoke Article 50 to commence Leave proceedings, and this could drag on for ages. The disengagement process itself is expected to take two years, or even three, and who knows what might happen in that period of time.
It looks very likely, at the time of writing, that Theresa May, a Remainer (albeit a very low key one), will win the leadership and may appoint other leading Remainers to key posts undermining Britain’s negotiating position. Who knows that we might not end up with some sort of deal that, whilst ostensibly freeing us from the EU’s embrace, effectively gives us a form of associate membership with qualified access to the single market but a qualified acceptance of free movement and other EU impositions; a sort of Norway minus.
The Constitution
This brings us on to the constitutional conundrums thrown up by the whole EU/referendum imbroglio like sparks from carriage wheels flying over stony ground. The referendum was technically non-binding, though of course the government of the day is bound, politically and ethically, to ‘respect’ the outcome. But there’s the rub. The government will effectively have changed in the intervening period between the voting and the conclusion of the negotiations with the EU. Indeed, even before the commencement of the negotiations, given that Article 50 has yet to be invoked. There will be a new prime minister within two and a half months, and although all the leadership contenders have committed themselves to give effect to the Leave verdict of the referendum we cannot know how they will behave behind closed doors.
Also, it is argued by some constitutional experts that leaving the EU would require Parliamentary approval in the form of the repeal of the European Communities Act of 1972 that gave effect to Britain’s accession, and surely some Parliamentary votes would be involved somewhere along the line. There is a very large majority for the EU in the present House of Commons, taking all parties combined. Labour is overwhelmingly pro-EU as is the SNP, the Liberal Democrats, the various odds-and-sods and a majority, though not great, of the Conservative Party. There is no reason why any of the Opposition parties should feel themselves bound by the referendum result given that they had had no part in its pledging or calling, and may well have thought it wrong in principle even to hold such a referendum. Would any anti-EU legislation get through? And, if not, what then? It would presumably trigger a general election (which is itself problematic given the accursed Fixed Term Parliaments Act the coalition drove through). And what might be the outcome of that? Another pro-EU Commons probably, with a smaller or possibly even greater EU majority than before?  
Suppose, also, that one or more of the leadership contenders had come from the backbenches rather than from within the ranks of government. Would they have felt bound by the referendum result given that they had had no part in the pledging or calling of it? They may have stood on a referendum platform at the last election but might personally have opposed it to their constituents. More seriously, whichever candidate wins the Tory leadership and premiership might decide to call a snap election to obtain a renewed mandate, and might lose or fail to obtain the mandate sought to take Britain out of the EU. It is interesting that of the five contenders two are Remainers, including the favourite, and so for all the talk of the new PM and Cabinet having to be Brexit in composition or complexion it might well not be. In place of Cameron, Osborne and Hammond we might get not Johnson, Gove and Leadsom but May, Osborne and Hammond!  The more things change the more they stay the same.
The Conservative Party
This brings us to the Conservative leadership contest. Michael Gove’s assassination of Boris might come to look increasingly stupid if it turns out that he would have been the only one capable of beating May (assuming of course that Gove’s purpose was to ensure a true Brexiteer is in Number 10). Gove is way behind May in MPs’ nominations at the moment and it is unclear if he will even get onto the ballot of members. There is speculation that some of May’s supporters may be backing Andrea Leadsom (currently second) specifically to deprive Gove of sufficient support, confident that May will beat Leadsom easily amongst the grassroots. Gove will anyway surely pay a price for his perfidy, at least within the ranks of Conservative MPs.
The whole business of Gove and Boris is assuming the proportions of Shakespearian tragedy and the more one thinks about it the more mysterious it becomes. I was stunned by Boris’s announcement, the more so coming as it did at the peroration of a lengthy and involved speech. Quite a punchline. Hitting hard by not hitting at all. Did Gove’s candidature really fatally hole Johnson’s bid below the waterline? If many of Johnson’s supporters were apparently flocking to Gove then why does Gove have so few supporters now amongst MPs? Did Johnson not have many to start with? Or was it the comments that Gove made about Boris’s lack of leadership qualities that made Johnson feel he was fatally compromised? Or was it that he never really wanted the leadership at all, astonishing as it may seem to say that? There are those who argue that Boris never thought he was going to win the Brexit campaign and was only staking a claim to high office, though Cameron had offered him that anyway to buy him off back in February. Did he not relish the prospect of taking office to clear up the mess the Remainers insist will be the fruits of Brexit, as Lord Heseltine claims?
And what of Michael Gove? Why his last minute Damascene conversion? It is typical of politicians to disavow any desire for the premiership or for high office at all, but they do not usually couple that with complete self abasement insisting they are totally unfitted for office, as Gove has done. Most pundits took Gove’s oft-stated claims at face value, and not out of naïveté (they never for example took Michael Heseltine’s disavowals of ambition seriously in the late 1980s). Was it a last minute conversion or had he been planning it all along? It seems too Machiavellian even for Gove, but how else can we explain it? He had been working alongside Boris for weeks and even months in the Brexit campaign and had seen him operate at very close quarters. He must already have formed an opinion of Boris’s capabilities as a leader, and they can surely only have been enhanced by the success of the campaign. There must be a great deal of chicanery that has yet to come out, and we may even have to wait for their memoirs to appear decades hence before all is revealed (and probably not even then). This will be meat for the historians for decades to come.
And as for Cameron! Like so much else in this drama the turn of events is riven with irony and paradox. He spent much of his political life posing as a eurosceptic, not very convincingly in my view, but convincingly enough for much of the commentariat. I always perceived him as euro-neutral rather than eurosceptic. He tried to steer his party away from euroscepticism ever since assuming the leadership but has been dogged by it. He then took a gamble to try to buy off his eurosceptic backbenchers and shoot the UKIP fox by promising the referendum. He may well have calculated that he was not going to win the 2015 election outright and that, as in the period 2010-2015, he would be reliant on Liberal Democrat support which would provide him with the pretext not to hold the pledged referendum – ‘I want to but those blasted Europhile Lib Dems in the Cabinet won’t let me’ he was going to cry. It would not be the first time a prime minister sought refuge from the die-hards in his own party in the embrace of a coalition partner.  But he won and had to make good on his pledge, and on other things he may not really have wanted to do.
But not to worry. With the whole weight of the establishment on his side; big business, the banks, most of the Labour Party, most of the trade unions, former PMs, the panjandrums of the EU, the World Bank, the IMF, think tanks and research institutes galore, showbiz celebrities, President Obama, Uncle Tom Cobleigh and all he was sure to win. And then as the campaign progressed it was not at all clear that he was going to win. More and more artillery was wheeled into place to blast the recalcitrant electorate into compliance; even museum pieces like Sir John Major and Lord Heseltine were brought out of storage. And still the easy victory he had anticipated seemed unclear on the horizon. Then the day of reckoning. Hoist by his own petard. And then the bitter recriminations. The sheepish sojourn to Brussels and the humiliation at the hands of the EU Council of Ministers. His treatment of Jeremy Corbyn at PMQs was priceless. Not the usual pantomime stuff but words of bitter scorn and a look of genuine and withering contempt at the Labour leader’s failure to prosecute the campaign more enthusiastically on his behalf. Thus Cameron seems to be evolving a strange new doctrine of Parliamentary democracy whereby it is the function of the Opposition to support the Government and to dig a prime minister out of a hole of his own making, even when the Opposition never had any part in the manufacture of that hole and had specifically advised against it. Hubris and nemesis. He may now be remembered as the Prime Minister who took Britain out of the EU and perhaps precipitated the break-up of the institution itself, the very last epitaph he would have written for himself given the choice.
The Labour Party   
 And that brings us to the Labour Party. What a farce! I am sure there has never been a situation quite like this in Parliamentary history (how many times have I said that in this essay). The present position, however, is the almost inevitable culmination of the decision made to throw open the election of a leader to the wider membership (a decision made by all the parties at different times), whatever form that may take. Inevitably the occasion will eventually arise when the membership elects someone unacceptable to the PLP. Something rather similar occurred to the Conservative Party when Iain Duncan-Smith was elected by the membership but was then eventually despatched by the Conservative Parliamentary Party, though Duncan-Smith almost certainly had more support amongst his MPs than Corbyn currently has amongst his.  
Of course that is why the party requires a candidate to secure a basic minimum proportion of MP nominations, which Jeremy Corbyn duly achieved, though only because some right-wing or centrist MPs nominated him to widen the debate. But many of these did not vote for him and subsequently regretted their actions in nominating him. Essentially the skids have been under Corbyn ever since his accession with a large part of the Blairite right of the party simply refusing to accept his leadership, and plotting to undermine him at every turn. Quite a few existing shadow cabinet members refused to serve under him from the outset, not even bothering to wait for his invitation. But nonetheless he seemed able to cobble together a reasonable coalition of MPs to form a shadow cabinet though the stresses showed over the vote on the bombing of Syria. However, it was really only a matter of time before there was a serious move against him, and it might have occurred after the local elections which were poor for an opposition party (though not as poor as many liked to paint it) but the right stayed its hand because of the looming referendum and the need, as they saw it, to hold the party together to campaign for Remain.
Corbyn is a veteran of the internal party battles of the 70s and 80s and retained the anti-Europeanism of the hard left of those times, always voting in the eurosceptic lobby. Yet he came out for Remain when the referendum campaign got under way, probably under pressure. Whilst he was in a minority, and sometimes a small minority, within the PLP on several issues he would have been in a tiny minority if he had come out for Leave, and with almost the whole party campaigning for Remain his position would have been utterly impossible. Even his grassroots base centred on ‘Momentum’ were overwhelmingly pro-EU. He compromised, in effect, by campaigning for Remain in a half-hearted way, pointing out the negatives as well as the positives of the EU, in a way that most of the party evidently found infuriating. It was even suggested that he might actually have voted for Leave in the privacy of the polling booth! Perhaps he calculated he would get the best of both worlds this way, but he seems to have ended up with the worst of both.
After the referendum was lost the party came down on him like a ton of bricks for failing to invigorate the Labour vote and even blamed him for the defeat of the whole Remain campaign. Yet this was absurd. A large majority of Labour voters did vote Remain, and it is very unlikely that a more whole-hearted effort on his part would have made any difference. Those Labour voters who were prepared to follow the party recommendation did so, and the rest were never going to do so. But the Blairites seized on this ‘failure’ as just the opportunity they had been craving to unseat Corbyn, aware that others on the left of the party also took a dim view of Corbyn’s lacklustre campaign. Mass resignations from the shadow cabinet ensued, which may or may not have been co-ordinated, on the Sunday following the referendum, together with a no-confidence motion which was tabled by the PLP and passed by an extraordinary 172-40. There were trenchant calls from all and sundry for him to go, but he has been adamant up to this point that he will not resign and if MPs want to unseat him they will have to issue a challenge. He knows that given the level of support he still enjoys among the grassroots he is likely to win another contest, though some of his erstwhile support may have ebbed away for a variety of reasons. A vexed question is whether, as incumbent, he would automatically be entitled to be on the ballot, given that it is very unlikely he would garner enough nominations from MPs, but the consensus of legal opinion is that he would be so entitled (only the Labour Party could contrive to have rules so opaque for this very basic issue to be in doubt).
The PLP has been very reluctant to produce a challenger to come forward, though it seems both Angela Eagle and Owen Smith have got the requisite number of nominations, largely because they know that Corbyn would probably win again, so there is at present a stand-off with continuing demands for his resignation, even from David Cameron, while Corbyn seals himself off and plods along, emboldened by his Praetorian guard of John McDonnell and Seamas Milne. He still apparently has the support of most of the big unions, though deputy leader Tom Watson has quite openly been trying to wrestle them away from him. It is a preposterous situation, and it is hard not to see the only possible resolution as a split in the party, either before or after a leadership contest. If Corbyn were to be victorious he would still not command the support of the PLP. At present he cannot even populate the Shadow Cabinet, with several posts vacant and some people doubling up. New bodies have been drafted in, but one resigned after only two days in the job – a new Parliamentary record! Paul Flynn has been sent to the frontline, at 81 the oldest front-bencher since Gladstone! It has got beyond a joke but there is yet no denouement in prospect.
Scotland
The SNP has long been seeking the excuse it needs to hold a second independence referendum, ever since losing the first one, and has long threatened that if the UK were to ‘take Scotland out of the EU against its will’ it would duly deliver. Sure enough in the wake of the EU referendum Nicola Sturgeon swung into action preparing the ground for it, and has also been to see EU leaders to try to negotiate directly with them over a Scottish application to join, even if Scotland were still part of the UK. Unfortunately for her the EU will not play ball with this one not least because several of them fear their own separatist movements (e.g. Spain vis a vis Catalonia) and do not want to give them any encouragement. Moreover, Sturgeon will be very cautious about actually calling a referendum unless she is sure she will win it, which is highly debatable at present given that Scotland would have to join the Euro as all new members are required, and the price of oil upon which the Scottish economy is heavily dependent is low. A second referendum defeat within a space of two to three years would kill it off for the foreseeable future.
I am not at all impressed with the Scottish nationalist argument anyway. They are still part of the UK, and, unlike any other part of the UK, have actually voted expressly to remain part of it. As such they have to accept the result of the nation as a whole and be governed by it. London and some other big cities also voted Remain but they are not demanding independence or continued adherence to the EU (except for a humorous call for London to be a city state). One might just as well ask what right Scotland would have to keep Britain in if England and Wales voted strongly out, as they did. Sturgeon pleads that there has been a material change of circumstances but things change all the time and if every such change provoked another referendum there would never be an end to it. Moreover, she is not constitutionally able to block Brexit as she has suggested, so matters north of the border are hanging in the air as elsewhere.
The European Union       
What of the institution itself at the heart of the whole imbroglio?
The EU has been crisis-ridden for several years now over the euro and the migrant influx, and now Brexit had added to the brew. Brexit will embolden other members to hold in-out referenda, euroscepticism now sweeping the continent, and there seems to be a real fear within the EU that the whole project might be de-railed and even break-up. Polls show that euroscepticism is even stronger in France than it is in Britain and nationalist movements and anti-EU parties, on both left and right, are on the march in several countries. However, I doubt that the EU will disintegrate. Paradoxically the exit of Britain may even produce another bout of integration as a reflex defence. Though they are all expressing regret at the departure of Britain there might be some who see it as a blessing since we have so often been a drag anchor on their projects, not in the euro and not in the Schengen area, always reluctant Europeans.
Within the next few months Britain will surely invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to trigger the exit negotiations, which can take up to two years (or even three if extended). Exactly what will then be negotiated is very unclear, since the Brexiteers were divided amongst themselves about what future for Britain they envisaged; the Norway option, the Canada option, the Albanian option (!?), etc, etc. The main question seems to be whether we can negotiate some sort of tariff-free access to the single market perhaps in return for a concession regarding the free movement of labour, but then it was opposition to free movement that was the chief driver for people voting out. The Brexiteers seem to think their ace card is that Europe exports far more to us than we export to them, and that therefore the imposition of reciprocal tariffs would not be to their advantage. The other ace up their sleeve is the putative negotiation of trade deals with the expanding economies in the third world (as was) but it remains to be seen what that will yield in the long term.
What is negotiated will also depend on who is doing the negotiating, which depends on who the new Prime Minister is and who is appointed as “Minister for Brexit”. At the time of writing (8th July) the contest has been narrowed down to Theresa May and Andrea Leadsom, thus guaranteeing us our second female PM,  with Michael Gove having been eliminated – probably paying the penalty for knifing Boris Johnson. May is heavy favourite, being by far the more experienced with a record six years under her belt as Home Secretary, but Leadsom has the advantage of being a prominent Brexiteer, and many party members being predominantly eurosceptic might yet opt for her. If May wins perhaps Leadsom will be the negotiator, and if Leadsom wins perhaps Gove. What ultimately emerges may be a kind of soft Brexit.
Chilcot
Just when you thought it was safe to watch the current affairs programmes again along comes the long-awaited Chilcot report on the Iraq war (it is impossible not to affix the adjective long-awaited given that it has taken seven years to plop weightily onto the mat). In its very measured way it has delivered a stinging indictment of Blair and his cabinet, the decision to go to war, the quality and use of the intelligence, the process whereby legality was established, the lack of preparation for the occupation post-conflict, the failure to properly equip British forces still using vehicles and equipment designed for other earlier conflicts such as Northern Ireland, etc., etc. Never I would imagine has a PM or government been so savaged by an independent official enquiry. Blair held his own press conference in the wake of Chilcot, repeating his mantra of self-justification, that he was convinced it was right to get rid of Saddam and that he would do the same again, and rejects any charge of falsifying intelligence (which Chilcot acquits him of anyway). But Blair now looks a haunted man, a ghost of his former self. He may have felt the hand of history on his shoulder but, with a motion to impeach him for misleading Parliament now being moved by Alex Salmond and supported by David Davis and probably Jeremy Corbyn, he may soon feel the heavy hand of the law on his collar. It is unlikely that any of this will lead anywhere vis a vis Blair, though there may be civil actions for negligence against the Ministry of Defence by bereaved families of slain service personnel.
Summary
Everything is so much up in the air that it is difficult to know what things will look like when matters have settled again. Having begun this essay by quoting one deceased politician let me conclude by quoting another, to wit Enoch Powell’s oft-repeated axiom that ‘all political lives end in failure...’. It is a cruel irony that Blair, for all his achievements in office and his feat of winning three successive elections for Labour, will now be remembered chiefly for the Iraq fiasco and Cameron in an equally cruel irony as the man who caused Britain to crash out of Europe and perhaps presaged the break-up of the United Kingdom. In Cameron’s case the irony is even more poignant given that he had long posed as a eurosceptic and then apparently underwent a Damascene conversion to the benefits of the EU, only to have the electors not unsurprisingly incline to question his sincerity. The stage is strewn with corpses: Cameron, Boris, Gove and now Leadsom (as I write) on the Conservative side and, perhaps, Corbyn on the Labour side, not to mention Nigel Farage who has yet again resigned as UKIP leader. It now seems certain given Leadsom’s withdrawal that we will have May as new Tory leader and PM very shortly. What sort of Brexit will she negotiate and will the Tory Party be united under her, or will the cracks start to show again once negotiations with Europe are under way? And Labour looks to be heading for a split whatever now happens, with Angela Eagle standing and Corbyn standing firm.
A week is a long time in politics and two and a half weeks (23rd June to 11th July) an eternity.

Neville Twitchell
11th July 2016






  






 












[1] On a psephological note I assume that the pollsters must have done surveys for the broadcasting organisations in each local authority area to gauge the likely outcome so as to have a baseline against which to measure the actual results, given that there is no precedent to use to measure ‘swing’ as would be the case in an election.

Thursday, 12 September 2013

Syria



SYRIA

The House of Commons managed to make one of its occasional sensible decisions last week by voting against the government motion to support American intervention in the Syrian civil war. It is very rare for the Commons to vote down a government motion on foreign affairs; in fact I believe it is the first time for 200 years; but it is all the more welcome for that. For once we have declined to be dragged along on American coat-tails and to get ourselves enmeshed in yet another Middle Eastern imbroglio, the consequences of which are unforeseeable but very possibly catastrophic, as per the Iraq fiasco.
There are many good reasons not to support the bombing of Syria. For starters it is still by no means certain that it was Assad’s regime that was responsible for the chemical attacks on a Damascus suburb that has provoked Obama’s ire. It is hard to see why Assad would do the one thing that would bring American (and perhaps British) intervention on the side of the rebels, given Obama’s comments about the use of chemical weapons being a “red line” last year. Assad must surely realise that that is the only action on his part that would seriously jeopardise his position. He appears to be gaining ground in the civil war, but American bombing of military installations and other targets would of course seriously undermine his capacity to continue the war. And to what purpose? Chemical weapons are very terrible things, which is why they are banned under international law, but they are surely no more effective in subduing a civilian population than conventional weapons. I cannot really buy Cameron’s claim in the Commons debate that he is “testing the West’s resolve”. On the other hand rebel groups do clearly have an incentive to use them if they possess them (and it is not absolutely clear that they don’t despite western insistence on this point). The British, the French and the Americans have all insisted that the Syrian regime was responsible, but then they would, wouldn’t they? No neutral country, i.e. one that is not itching to attack Assad, has yet asserted this, and anyway the intelligence about all of this is still very hazy. We have not even yet had the UN inspectors report, which will surely answer a lot of questions – though not necessarily the identity of the culprits. It may well be that Assad was responsible, but let’s try to establish this point first before rushing into precipitate action.
But let us assume that Assad was responsible for the attacks. Does this justify military intervention? Despite all the talk of precision bombing and surgical strikes, etc, etc, it is almost certainly the case that heavy attacks by cruise missiles would result in substantial civilian deaths. So we would be punishing Assad for killing civilians by killing civilians ourselves. It is just that our weapons would not be chemical ones, but civilian deaths are civilian deaths however they are brought about. And it is hypocritical, to put it mildly, for western powers to rail against chemical weapons use when they themselves have for decades manufactured and stockpiled them. The Americans used white phosphorus in Iraq, which I believe is a chemical weapon in all but name.
We cannot calculate what would be the effect of heavy strikes against Assad, and what effect that might have on the balance of forces in the country. Would they be so heavy as to tip the balance in favour of the rebels, in which case it would amount to an attempt at regime change, the thing that the British and American governments have almost certainly desired, for whatever obscure geo-political reasons of their own, all along. But who would that enthrone in Syria? The Free Syrian movement of course strenuously disavows any connection with Al Qaida and other militant Islamic groups, but the situation on the ground is evidently so complex, and there are so many different contending groups that militant Islamists would surely be empowered in parts of the country. Conversely, if the American bombing were relatively light, i.e. punitive and deterrent, but not preventive, it might be utterly ineffective in having the desired deterrent effect. What if, some way down the line, further chemical atrocities were perpetrated? The US could scarcely just shrug its shoulders and go away after having committed itself to action. It would result in further and heavier bombing, which might still prove ineffectual. It should be remembered that in 1998 Kosova and Serbia endured very intense bombing for 75 days without yielding, and that ultimately it was only the threat of a land invasion that forced Milosevic’s surrender. Would there ultimately have to be a threat of a land invasion in Syria. Ever heard of mission creep.
And it has to be said that the neo-cons and liberal interventionists who advocate bombing are always highly selective in their choice of enemy. It is currently Assad, but what about the numerous instances of attacks on civilians elsewhere in the world, not least the deliberate shooting of thousands of unarmed protesters in Egypt by the new military regime there. Not a peep out of the neo-cons about that, nor from Obama for that matter – in fact the US government still refuses even to admit that what happened in Egypt was a military coup, because that would mean they could not legally supply weapons to them. It looks very much as if “the West” is taking the side of the Sunni powers Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar against the Shia powers, Syria and Iran, in the Islamic power struggle that seems to be taking shape in the Middle East at the moment.

I strongly suspect that, contrary to appearances, Obama is not really at all keen on intervention against Syria, given that he was elected on a platform to extricate the US from its entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan and that the very last thing he wants is yet another US war in the middle east. But he painted himself into a corner by denouncing in advance the use of chemical weapons last year, and now feels honour bound to follow through on this, especially given the pressure he is under from Senate hawks like McCain to take action. After all, before now it was Cameron who was desperately trying to inveigle Obama into action, not the other way around. He did not seem all that strident in his rhetoric, unlike John Kerry, who was breathing fire last week, and it may well be that he is also under pressure from within his administration from Kerry and others in the State Department. His decision to seek Congressional approval for any action was understandable from a political standpoint (though not necessary under the Constitution) but he must surely not have been unaware of the dovish mood in the House and in the country at large and the strong possibility that he might be defeated, just as Cameron was in Britain. Is that what he really wanted? Maybe. It would get him off the hook because he could scarcely seek Congressional approval and then go ahead if he failed to get it.
And now the Russian initiative has given him another life-line. Obama was careful not to sound too ready to grab it in his address to the American people yesterday, not wanting to sound gullible or weak, but I fancy he is breathing sighs of relief and hoping that the Syrians will be sufficiently compliant with any chemical handover programme for him to announce “job done” at some time in the future, without any bombing. The claims that Putin is “playing him like a fiddle” overlook the point that Obama may see the whole thing as to his advantage, proving that diplomacy and the threat of force are more effective than the use of force. And Britain can congratulate itself on having divorced itself from any of this at the outset.












Tuesday, 27 November 2012

The Politics of the Rope



My book The Politics of the Rope: The Campaign to Abolish Capital Punishment in Britain, 1955-69 has just been published (Arena, softback, 400 pp., October 2012, £18.99). It is essentially the long version of my PhD thesis of the same title, which I have been trying to get published for a long time. It is a work of political history, being an account of the campaign to abolish hanging in this country, focusing more or less completely on the critical years from the mid 1950s to the late 1960s. It deals with the campaign from a very broad perspective, taking in the Parliamentary manoeuvring and pressure group activity, but covering also social, religious and cultural factors, and setting it in the context of the liberalising mood of the times and the raft of conscience legislation on abortion, divorce and homosexuality . It seeks to demonstrate the way in which social and cultural trends can flow into and out of politics. 

It is based chiefly on primary sources, including much material hitherto largely overlooked, including the papers of the main abolitionist pressure group, much Home Office documentation drawn from the National Archives, and the papers of the chief political parties. 



It includes a discussion of the treatment of the hanging issue by the mass media, especially television, radio, film and theatre, and its coverage by the press, both popular and specialist; and draws, inter alia, on the written archives of the BBC; and demonstrates the way in which the question was woven into the fabric of popular culture. There is an analysis of the activities of the various professional bodies representing the police, the prison service and the legal profession and how important they were in influencing the course of political debate, and there is a lengthy discusion of the role of the various churches and how their position evolved during the course of the fifties and sixties. There is a chapter on opinion polls and the importance, or unimportance, of public opinion, and there is an analysis of the significance of the various miscarriages and causes celebre of the era, particularly the cases of Timothy Evans, Derek Bentley and Ruth Ellis and to what extent they weighed on public opinion.

Later chapters deal with the governmental manoeuvring over the entrenchment of abolition and the attempts to beat off a strong campaign to restore hanging at the earliest opportunity in the wake of a number of high profile murder cases, attributed, rightly or wrongly, to the abolition of hanging; the tangentially associated campaigns about other "conscience" issues such as the legalisation of homosexuality, the liberalising of divorce and abortion, the abolition of theatre censorship and the relaxation of the Sunday Observance laws. There is an analysis of the reasons for the ultimate success of the campaign despite consistently adverse public opinion and in the teeth of institutional hostility from the judiciary, much of the Conservative Party, the police and prison service and much of the right-wing press.

 The book is available on Amazon and from most major booksellers.





  

Monday, 19 March 2012

The Iron Lady

The Iron Lady shows signs of metal fatigue

I finally got to see this much hyped film recently. It is undeniably an interesting and even an intriguing film, though very far from being a great or even an outstanding one. I say this because whilst it undoubtedly leaves a deep impression on the mind and features a very remarkable performance from Meryl Streep as the eponymous ferrous female, the film has too many deep and significant flaws.
As is well known the film depicts the now aged and infirm Lady Thatcher as the framing device within which we see her development as a person and as a politician. Streep’s performance has not been over praised. It is the most extraordinary portrayal of a real and living person that I have ever seen, almost eerily so. As the aged Thatcher it is at times hard to believe that we are not watching the real person, so brilliant is her impersonation, with its mixture of stridency and dithering, and as the younger, prime-of-life Thatcher, she is equally impressive, conveying the brisk, bustling authority and unflinching certainty. This no mere impression a la Rory Bremner, Jon Culshaw, or Ronnie Ancona, but rather the production of a believable individual by inhabiting that person’s universe. The once iron lady is now suffering a severe case of metal fatigue, and her hold on rationality is uncertain, hard-headed commonsense flickering on and off like a torch with a dodgy battery, as she fights off the attentions of her now dead husband. The propriety of this approach to the portrayal of a still-living person has of course been questioned, but it is a compelling, though hackneyed narrative device.
But whilst the performances are outstanding the problem with the film really lies with its politics, and the extreme difficulty of trying to encapsulate a long and tempestuous premiership within the confines of a ninety minute film. Clearly the film-makers (director Phyllida Lloyd and screenwriter Abi Morgan who wrote The Hour) had decided not to focus on any single aspect of the Thatcher premiership such as the miners strike, the Falklands War, or the Brighton hotel bombing, as one might have imagined that they would do, and instead we get a panorama of her years in power, ranging from industrial strife, to the Falklands, to Cabinet arguments over economic policy, to Europe, the Brighton bombings and the IRA, the Cold War, etc, etc. You name it and it is there, briefly covered and mainly in the form of contemporary archival news footage, with perhaps the odd little scene involving Thatcher and a collection of ministers, or a House of Commons scene. This is okay as a sketch of her time in office, but it fails to get to grips with the core of her political beliefs and the reasons why her premiership was so intensely controversial. Did her government transform the country and was this for better or worse? These are the questions that need to be addressed, but aren’t really, and cannot really be in a ninety minute film.
The political scenes are reasonably well handled, though often not totally convincing. There is the usual rather stodgy depiction of the Commons as a bear garden stuffed with braying backbench MPs, though as so often its authenticity is undercut by making it a little too homogeneous in composition, mannerisms and behaviour. In particular literally every singly Tory MP is male, whereas in reality there was, even then, a smattering of females on the backbenches (on both sides), and it has apparently been admitted by the film-makers that this was done deliberately so as to emphasise how she stood out in sharp relief from the broad mass of her party by virtue of her “femaleness”. It may be an effective dramatic device, but it is factually incorrect and therefore irritating to a political anorak such as myself. Also the Cabinet scenes, or scenes of meetings with ministers, are moderately convincing but the line-up is curiously selective. We get a lot of Sir Geoffrey Howe, for example, right through the premiership, but little of some other equally prominent Cabinet members. In particular I failed to spot Willie Whitelaw at all, which is an extraordinary omission given not only that he was deputy prime minister, and the man she defeated for the leadership but also of vital importance to the success of her premiership, especially in its early days when relations with much of the party was rocky to say the least. He was the chief representative of the “wets” in the party, and a man whose continued loyalty was vital for her secure continuance of backbench support. As she famously said, in an inadvertent witticism, “Every prime minister needs a Willy”. Others too are strangely AWOL, unless I missed them in the multiplicity of characters who appear, such as key acolyte Norman Tebbit, Chancellor Nigel Lawson and, most extraordinary of all the absences (again unless I missed him), Sir Keith Joseph, her chief political mentor. There is very little evidence of any leading Labour Party figures either, with just Michael Foot appearing in one lengthy Commons scene, but where was Wilson, Callaghan, Kinnock or numerous others? This may have been because there wasn’t the time or space to accommodate every leading figure – the cast after all changed greatly over the course of her eleven year premiership - but may be because of the political ignorance of the filmmakers, unaware of the key significance of certain politicians to Thatcher’s political development. Maybe they were there but relatively inconspicuous with Howe chosen, for some reason, to stand in as the permanent representative of her Cabinet, and portrayed as rather feeble and pusillanimous.
If so, it is not only a failing regarding authenticity but indicative of the film’s total failure to grapple with the hard politics of the times. Where were the arguments over economic policy, tax and spending, privatisation, monetarism, inflation, etc?  Admittedly these are hard concepts to deal with in a ninety minute film, and one starts to wish for a lengthier treatment which only television can give. Indeed such treatment has been given in such BBC offerings as “Margaret Thatcher: The Long Walk to Finchley” (2008), directed by Niall MacCormick, written by Tony Saint and starring Andrea Riseborough, dealing mainly with her rise, and “Margaret” (2009), directed by James Kent, written by Richard Cottan and starring Lindsay Duncan, about her fall. Admittedly the former looks and sounds a bit like “Carry On Up The Conservative Party”, but never mind. Or indeed the “Falklands Play” (2002), directed by Michael Samuels and written by Ian Curteis, where she is portrayed very effectively, though without any attempt at physical impersonation, by Patricia Hodge, dealing with a single decisive issue of her career in great depth and providing a very effective drama about what was arguably the turning point of her premiership.
There are other liberties too. Mrs Thatcher was certainly not present at the murder by car bomb of her mentor Airey Neave, and to show her rushing to him after his death is a dramatic liberty much too far and more in keeping with the conventions of a Hollywood blockbuster than a serious British film dealing with real-life events. It would have been just as effective, and in keeping with the truth, to have shown her horrified reaction on camera when she was informed of his death during the course of the 1979 election campaign. Even Mrs Thatcher did not wear a hat in the chamber of the Commons, where headgear is strictly prohibited. Another error, and one that I feel may be inadvertent, unlike the aforementioned, is her “makeover session” with Gordon Reece and Neave, which did not take place until she was well into her spell as Leader of the Opposition, and not before her election to the leadership as the film suggests. And what of the odd bit of dialogue in this scene where, as she prepares for her leadership bid against Heath, she is saying to Reece and Neave that she did not imagine that she would ever be prime minister! Why then was she standing for the leadership? Did she envisage leading the Tories to electoral defeat if she gained the leadership? This makes no sense politically or dramatically, and is at odds with the whole tenor of the film, which correctly portrays her as utterly convinced of her right, duty and capacity to lead the country.
There are also the obligatory series of vignettes of her early life, her adolescence, her relationship with her parents; very warm and intimate with her revered father, the legendary Alderman Roberts, and a tad distant with her mother, and mocked by schoolmates for being a swat. Then we follow her entry into politics as the very young Conservative candidate for Dartford, and her meeting with the young Denis Thatcher and his evident infatuation with her. We are invited to believe that she was patronised and looked down upon by the, then, patrician and male party grandees, sparking her determination to succeed in spite of their scorn. Again, it is debatable as to how true a representation this is of Tory internal politics at the time. The fact remains that she was nominated as Tory candidate for Dartford in 1951, at the age of twenty-five and then for the safe Tory seat of Finchley for the 1959 general election, at the age of thirty-four or younger, so the prejudice in Tory circles against a petit bourgeois woman cannot have been that great. Denis is portrayed in these early scenes as a bit of a buffoon, and then again as the spectre haunting Margaret in old age as a tiresome prankster. This is at odds with what we know of the tough, hard-headed, and very right-wing businessman we know him to have been.
There are affecting scenes as we see the aged Margaret pore over home recordings of her time playing with the children, Carol and Mark, as she symbolically runs the film backwards, murmuring about how “they grow up so fast”. We see the old lady fight her way back to sanity with the help of daughter Carol (well played in a low key by Olivia Coleman), ultimately dismissing the spectre of Denis, getting rid of his clothes, a leitmotif of the film, and struggling to regain her grip on reality, a battle we are invited to understand she wins.
This is an extraordinary take on a remarkable life, but then the scenes of her dotage could in a sense be anyone’s, so why pick on her?

A beguiling but unsatisfactory film.

19th March 2012